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Abstract
The fact that there exist in nature thoroughly deterministic systems whose
future behavior cannot be predicted, no matter how advanced or fined-tune
our cognitive and technical abilities turn out to be, has been well established
over the last decades or so, essentially in the light of two different theoretical
frameworks, namely chaos theory and (some deterministic interpretation of)
quantum mechanics. The prime objective of this paper is to show that there
actually exists an alternative strategy to ground the divorce between determin-
ism and predictability, a way that is older than – and conceptually independent
from – chaos theory and quantum mechanics, and which has not received much
attention in the recent philosophical literature about determinism. This for-
gotten strategy – embedded in the doctrine called “emergent evolutionism” –
is nonetheless far from being a mere historical curiosity that should only draw
the attention of philosophers out of their concern for comprehensiveness. It has
been indeed recently revived in the works of respected scientists.
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1. Introduction
If, during the dawn of modern science, it was once firmly believed that
the behavior of deterministic systems was in principle predictable, things have
now changed. In the light of the frameworks that are chaos theory and (some
deterministic interpretation of) quantum theory, it has been extensively and
convincingly shown over the past decades that some systems can be conceived
of as deterministic, and yet be radically unpredictable.
The prime objective of this paper is to identify and describe an alternative
strategy, embedded in the doctrine of “emergent evolutionism”, which is older
than – and conceptually independent from – chaos theory and quantum me-
chanics, and which is also able to ground the divorce between determinism and
predictability.
In section 2, I begin by setting the stage in a twofold movement. First, I pro-
pose a conceptual analysis of the notion of determinism through four different
theses, namely “ontological determination”, “state determinateness”, “epistemic
determination” and “state determinability”. On this basis, I then lay down the
overall structure of what I will refer to as the “Laplacean argument”, according
to which some minimal form of determinism necessarily entails predictability.
This argument will be purposively framed in a way that renders explicit its de-
pendence on three controversial inferences I1, I2 and I3. In section 3, I concisely
mention the way in which chaos theory and (some deterministic interpretation
of) quantum mechanics constitute proper places to object to the Laplacean ar-
gument, namely through the idea of algorithmic incompressibility (to the effect
that I1 is denied) and the impossibility of performing non-disturbing (position)
measurements (to the effect that I2 is denied), respectively. Finally, in section
4, I turn to the original, older framework that is emergent evolutionism, which,
as its name suggests, rejects the Laplacean picture by invoking the existence of
“emergent” entities and laws through evolution (to the effect that I3 is denied).
While the first two strategies have received much attention over the last
decades in the philosophical literature, the third one is often overlooked as a
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consistent – though metaphysically heavy – alternative way of grounding the
idea that determinism and unpredictability can peacefully coexist. Emergent
evolutionism is however more than just a historical curiosity. It has been recently
revived in the works of respected scientists, coming essentially from the field of
condensed matter physics, and this should constitute a sufficient clue that it
deserves renewed attention from the community of philosophers of science.
2. The Laplacean Argument
In order to set the stage for the subsequent discussion, let us begin by ana-
lyzing the very general and somewhat ambiguous notion of determinism through
four different theses1. First:
(Lo) Ontological determination. There exists a uniform and univo-
cal determinative relationship between successive states of a given
system, to the effect that two similar systems in the same state and
the same conditions at time t are in the same state at all times t∗.
Extended to the whole universe, Lo states that when two worlds agree at t, they
agree at all t∗. Second:
(So) State determinateness. There is a fact about the state in which
a given system is at each time t.
This second ingredient, which is seldom explicitly stated but often tacitly en-
dorsed, is required for Lo to hold, insofar as for two systems (or two worlds) to
be able to agree at any time t, there must at least be something to agree on at
t.
1The first one, Lo, corresponds to a metaphysical way of framing determinism that can
be found, for example, in Boyd (1972), Schurz (1995) or Earman (2007) (under the name of
“Laplacean determinism”). Adding the second thesis, So, to the picture is not an unusual
move; see for instance Glymour (1971) or Bishop (2003).
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Both theses Lo and So, which are primarily ontological claims about systems
in the world and the way they evolve through time, can be given epistemological
counterparts – Le and Se, respectively – which are claims about the access that
cognitive beings can have to the states of these systems and the determinative
relations between these states. Thus:
(Le) Epistemic determination. The uniform and univocal determi-
native relationship that exists between successive states of a given
system can be decrypted by a cognitive agent and captured un-
der the form of a predictive algorithm. A predictive algorithm is
a formal device (e.g. a set of equations) that allows in principle a
cognitive agent to determine the state of the system at any time t∗
from complete knowledge of its state at t (provided that, between t
and t∗, nothing changes in the nature of the system that renders the
algorithm obsolete).
(Se) State determinability. The fact about the state in which a given
system is at each time t can be known and specified by a cognitive
agent.
If we now consider that a given system is predictable in principle (P ) when its
states at all times t∗ can, as a matter of principle, be predicted by a cognitive
agent at a previous time t, then we may lay down the structure of an argu-
ment that expresses a belief – viz. that deterministic systems are predictable
in principle – that has been part of our scientific tradition since its advent in
modernity. The argument – to which I will from now on refer as the “Laplacean
argument” – runs like this (where theses Pi are the basic premises, Ii additional
entailments traditionally taken for granted, and C the overall conclusion):
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(P1) Lo
(P2) So
(I1) Lo → Le
(I2) So → Se
(I3) Le ∧ Se → P
(C) P
In a nutshell, the argument expresses the idea that, given the assumptions that
the state of a system at t∗ is univocally determined by its state at t (P1) and
that the system has well-defined states at t∗ and t (P2), then an absolutely com-
petent cognitive being (e.g. a Laplacean demon) should be able to capture the
determinative relationship between these states under the form of a predictive
algorithm (I1), as well as specify precisely what the state of the system is at t
and plug this specification into her algorithm (I2). As a result, such a demonic
calculator should be able to predict what the state of the system at t∗ will turn
out to be (I3), and hence the system would be predictable in principle (C)
2.
It may be pointed out that Lo∧So constitutes what can be referred to as “on-
tological determinism”, whereas (Le∧Se)∧P rather constitutes “epistemological
determinism”3. While the former consists of a claim about the determinative
relations holding in the world, the latter pertains to the way in which cognitive
agents can come to know these relations and exploit this knowledge to make
predictions. According to the Laplacean argument presented above, ontological
determinism entails epistemological determinism, and hence predictability.
2In what follows, I will regularly use the metaphor of the demon to capture the idea of a
“perfectly competent cognitive being”. In order to be philosophically useful, such a metaphor
should be understood in the following sense: a “Laplacean demon” is an idealized scientist
whose cognitive and technological powers consist in infinite extensions of the powers of real
human scientists. Accordingly, a “Laplacean demon” is not an omnipotent god that could
overtly transgress what turns out to be physically possible according to our best scientific
theories.
3For early uses of this distinction – albeit with slightly different terminologies –, see for
instance Popper (1956), Hunt (1987) or Redhead (1987).
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3. Around the Laplacean argument: contemporary strategies
That the Laplacean argument is mistaken – to the effect that there ex-
ist ontologically deterministic, yet unpredictable systems – has been massively
vindicated over the last few decades from two different scientific perspectives,
namely chaos theory and (some deterministic interpretation of) quantum me-
chanics. In this section, I briefly mention how these theories indeed provide
adequate frameworks to argue against the Laplacean picture by rejecting either
I1 or I2, respectively. In section 4, I will turn to the real core of this paper by
showing how a different, older framework – emergent evolutionism – is able to
object to the Laplacean picture in yet another fashion, namely by denying the
truth of I3
4.
But before turning to this, it is worth stressing the fact that chaos theory,
(some deterministic interpretation of) quantum mechanics and emergent evolu-
tionism have in common that they object to – rather than merely circumvent –
the Laplacean argument. Accordingly, these approaches take the conclusion
of the argument (P ) as false while taking both its premises (Lo and So) as
true. With that in mind, the obvious strategy one can adopt in order to argue
for in-principle unpredictability through ontological indeterminism, defined as
¬Lo ∨ ¬So, is not to be considered here5.
4I acknowledge the heterogeneity of the three frameworks envisioned here as strategies
to object to the Laplacean argument (the first is something like a set of scientific models,
the second some interpretation of a scientific theory and the third a philosophical doctrine).
Nonetheless, this heterogeneity is not detrimental to the project of the present paper, insofar
as identifying the possible options to oppose an argument doesn’t a priori require these options
to be related in a certain way. I thank an anonymous reviewer of this journal for having drawn
my attention on this.
5Such a strategy is often put forward through an appeal to the so-called “orthodox” in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics (see for instance Popper & Eccles (1977), p. 33). It
ultimately rests on the two following facts (Maudlin (1998)): in some circumstances – typi-
cally when a “measurement” occurs, whatever that means –, the determinative relationship
between successive quantum events – the “collapse” – is intrinsically chancy (denial of Lo),
and/or quantum events themselves are not determinate (denial of So).
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3.1. Denying I1 through chaos
The way I framed the Laplacean argument in the previous section renders
explicit a first strategy to invalidate it, namely denying the truth of I1, according
to which ontological determination necessarily leads to epistemic determination
(Lo → Le). Adopting such a strategy requires us to identify natural systems
that are ontologically determined (so that Lo is true) and yet for which it is
impossible to devise a predictive algorithm (to the effect that Le is false).
Over the last decades or so, a wealth of literature has been devoted to con-
vincingly showing that good candidates for such systems are chaotic systems.
It has indeed been argued that the behavior of chaotic systems cannot be ex-
pressed in a closed-form solution, to the effect that there is no shorter algorithm
to determine a future state of a chaotic system than the one that contains com-
plete information about the system in question and its evolution (Stone (1989)).
Surely, the latter claim implies that cognitive agents, no matter how competent,
have to confine themselves to merely inspect – rather than predict – what a fu-
ture state of a chaotic system will turn out to be, for there is no possible shortcut
for knowing such state “ahead of time”, i.e. before the state in question actually
obtains. Put differently, when it comes to chaotic systems, it happens that the
best algorithm that a Laplacean demon can come up with is incompressible. All
the demon can do in order to determine what a future state of the system will
be is to “wait and see”. And surely enough, such a procedure doesn’t count as
a prediction, insofar as an essential part of what prediction is is that there is
a temporal antecedence between the moment when the prediction is performed
and the moment when it is supposed to come true (or not)6.
6It is noteworthy that the notion of algorithmic incompressibility is not restricted to chaos
theory. It is also used in the context of computational science as a way of vindicating in-
principle unpredictability in spite of determination (see for instance Huneman (2012)). It also
turns out that the fate for predictability in chaos is even direr, for it has also been argued that
chaotic systems cannot be the objects of infinitely accurate measurements (Bishop (2003)),
a fact that, when combined with the property of sensitivity to initial conditions, hinders
predictability. This latter line of argument – which actually amounts to an objection to the
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3.2. Denying I2 through (Bohmian) quantum mechanics
Another strategy to object to the Laplacean argument as it has been framed
in section 2 consists in denying the truth of entailment I2. This requires us
to find some natural systems whose states are perfectly well-defined (so that
So is true), and yet these states cannot be specified by a perfectly competent
cognitive being (to the effect that Se is false).
It has been shown that good candidates for such systems are quantum sys-
tems as considered in the light of a (ontologically) deterministic interpretation
of quantum mechanics, on the model of Bohmian quantum mechanics (Albert
(1992), Fine (1996))7. Indeed, while in such a framework Le turns out to be
true – for, given knowledge of the particles’ positions and wave functions at
any given moment, one can thoroughly predict these at all future times, thanks
to the predictive algorithm that is the conjunction of the Schro¨dinger equation
and the guiding equation –, there is a consistent, available explanation, which
can be formulated within the theory, of why a Laplacean demon should indeed
lack the ability to precisely know the positions and wave functions of quantum
particles at any given moment (see for instance Albert (1992), pp. 164-169).
In a nutshell, such an explanation rests on the idea that non-disturbing mea-
surements are precluded by the theory: being able to determine the position
of quantum particles without changing their wave function would amount to a
violation of the uncertainty relations.
Laplacean argument through the negation of I2 – is even more acute when one supplements it
with the claim that chaotic systems, like other physical systems, ultimately have a quantum-
mechanical basis (Kellert (1993), p. 40, Schurz (1995), p. 138 or Bricmont (1995), p. 133).
This second line of argument is addressed in the next section.
7I do not consider here the alternative, ontologically deterministic approach that is Ev-
erettian quantum mechanics, though I suspect that its stance towards the Laplacean picture
is essentially the same as the Bohmian one. I also take “Bohmian mechanics” to refer to
the ontologically deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics that philosophers usu-
ally discuss, independently of the historical fact that, in the works of David Bohm himself,
ontological determinism was not always embraced.
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4. An original alternative: emergent evolutionism
In the previous section, I briefly mentioned how two specific scientific frame-
works have recently provided us with the resources for objecting to the Laplacean
argument, by rejecting either I1 (in the case of chaos theory) or I2 (in the case of
Bohmian mechanics). In the present section, I turn to an original, older and of-
ten overlooked framework – emergent evolutionism – on the basis of which it can
also be claimed that ontologically deterministic systems can be unpredictable
in principle. I begin with an overview of the core tenets of the doctrine (section
4.1). On this basis, I explicate the way in which it objects to the Laplacean
picture, namely by denying the truth of I3 (section 4.2).
4.1. Central tenets of the doctrine
Historically, the doctrine of emergent evolutionism has been mainly cham-
pioned in Great Britain by Lloyd Morgan (Morgan (1923)) and in the United
States by Roy Wood Sellars (under the equivalent name of “evolutionary nat-
uralism”; Sellars (1922)). In a nutshell, the core tenets of the view can be
characterized through the following set of claims:
• Emergent evolutionism is a view about the natural world’s evolution broadly
construed, viz. as the orderly advance, through time, of natural events.
• From the outset, emergent evolutionism is built in order to avoid the re-
spective difficulties of two alternative, opposite views of evolution, namely
gradualism and saltationism (Sartenaer (forthcominga)). Gradualism is
the thesis – endorsed by Darwin himself and emphasized through his
repetitive use of the maxim: “Natura non facit saltum” – according to
which biological changes occur continuously by a slow accumulation of in-
finitesimal alterations on very large time scales. By contrast, saltationism
is the view that biological change can occur as a result of saltations, or
sudden and discontinuous alterations. As Huxley (Huxley (1893), p. 77)
put it contra Darwin: “Nature does make jumps now and then”. From the
point of view of emergent evolutionism, gradualism necessarily leads to an
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unacceptable form of reductionism (due to the requirement of continuity,
new entities are reducible to the substrate from which they have appeared,
given some environmental conditions) and saltationism to an unacceptable
form of dualism (due to the requirement of discontinuity, new entities are
heterogeneous to the substrate from which they have appeared)8.
• Accordingly, emergent evolutionism can be seen as a middle course be-
tween gradualism and saltationism. By conciliating continuity and dis-
continuity in evolution, emergent evolutionism claims to be a monistic,
yet antireductionistic view of evolution. As a result, even if all the natu-
ral entities that arise through time belong to one and the same tissue of
events, some of these entities can be considered as “genuine evolutionary
novelties” that cannot be reduced to the substrate from which they have
appeared.
• Such a view is articulated around the notion of emergence, which captures
an empirical relationship between a putative emergent E and its basis B,
in such a way that (i) B univocally and completely determines E, and
yet (ii) E is “genuinely novel” with regard to B. Emergent evolutionism
is then the thesis according to which, during evolution, entities regularly
emerge.
• The ambiguous expression of “genuine novelty” is unpacked by emergent
evolutionists through the more precise notion of in-principle unpredictabil-
ity. Accordingly, a given entity E is said to emerge on a basis B at a given
time in evolution if (i) B univocally and completely determines E and yet
(ii) the advent of E could not have been predicted from the most complete
8While it is clear that emergent evolutionists like Morgan and Sellars did consider Dar-
win’s gradualism and continuism as entailing reductionism – actually because they construed
darwinian evolution as being also purely quantitative, so that the distinction between different
orders of life was to be taken as a difference of degree and not of kind (Blitz (1992)) –, it is of
course not entirely clear whether Darwin’s original theory has to be considered as intrinsically
reductionistic.
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knowledge of B, even by an absolutely competent cognitive being (e.g. a
Laplacean demon).
• Why entities emerge through evolution can be understood on the basis of
a continuous increase of their degree of “relatedness” (or “organization”)9.
Each time some pre-existing materials aggregate in a certain way, a new
mode of relatedness obtains that corresponds to an emergent. Such mode
of relatedness did not exist, even “implicitly” or “potentially”, within these
pre-existing materials.
• The advent of new modes of relatedness between pre-existing natural en-
tities – i.e. the advent of emergents – is something to be noted as a
brute empirical fact that admits no explanation whatsoever. It just has
to be loyally accepted “in the frankly agnostic attitude proper to science”
(Morgan (1923), p. 9). Put differently, the “emergence law” that connects
an emergent E to its basis B is a brute, ultimate, final, fundamental or
sui generis law, in the sense that it is non-deducible from other already
existing laws (and, in particular, the laws that govern the behavior of B).
• The process of continuous aggregation of entities bringing about emergents
is cumulative, so emergents can themselves aggregate to give rise to new
emergents, etc. As a result, beside having a “forward” direction in time,
evolution has an “upward” direction within what appears to be a layered
natural hierarchy, in which natural entities are ordered from lower-level,
less internally organized (and older) entities to higher-level, more complex
9It turns out that emergent evolutionists endorsed such a progressive construal of evolution
(see for instance Alexander (1920)’s nisus, corresponding to an intrinsic evolutionary tendency
driving things from lower levels of existence towards the ultimate quality, namely “deity”), but
this is actually not a necessary tenet for the construal of emergence or novelty that matters
here. Emergent evolutionists could perfectly have endorsed an emergentist view of evolution
while considering – on Darwin’s model – that evolution doesn’t necessarily produce increasing
complexity. I thank an anonymous reviewer of this journal for having drawn my attention on
this.
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(and more recent) entities.
A toy example can help to render more concrete this concise characterization
of the core ideas of emergent evolutionism. Let us consider a chemist in her
lab who somehow synthesizes a molecule XY on the basis of the pre-existing
molecules X and Y. Let us also suppose that she knows everything there is
to know about the chemistry of the individual molecules X and Y (and the
chemistry of other compounds in which separately figure X and Y, like XW and
YZ) as well as the environmental conditions in which the synthesis of X and Y
into XY is performed. According to emergent evolutionism, the molecule XY
corresponds to a new mode of relatedness of X and Y that is not “implicit” or
“potential” in X and Y. Its advent then constitutes a brute empirical fact, to
the extent that the very nature and behavior of XY cannot be explained from
the most perfect foreknowledge of the chemistry of X and Y (and the chemistry
of other compounds like XW and YZ). All the chemist can do is note the nature
of XY and observe its behavior, in order to use her observations as a basis for a
new (branch of) chemistry, namely the chemistry of XY. If we chose to tell this
story by talking about laws, we could say that the laws of XY-chemistry are not
deducible from the conjunction of the laws of X-chemistry and Y-chemistry (as
well as the laws of XW-chemistry and YZ-chemistry), for the law connecting
X and Y to XY – a compositional law called an “emergence law” – is brute,
fundamental or sui generis, and therefore itself non-deducible from the laws of
X-chemistry and Y-chemistry (as well as the laws of XW-chemistry and YZ-
chemistry)10.
It then makes sense to claim that the molecule XY emerges from the molecules
X and Y – or that there is emergent evolution from X and Y to their combi-
nation XY –, which is another way of expressing the following twofold idea: (i)
10This is actually the spirit of C.D. Broad’s construal of emergence (Broad (1925)), which
would later become the direct target of the criticisms formulated by philosophers like Ernst
Nagel, for whom metaphysically-flavored non-deducible emergence laws should be replaced by
empirical bridge principles (see for instance Nagel (1961), chapter 11).
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the nature and behavior of XY are univocally and completely determined by
X and Y – in accordance with the corresponding emergence law –, and yet (ii)
the chemist would not have been able to predict the nature and behavior of XY
from her knowledge, no matter how perfect, of the chemistry of X and Y. An-
other, collateral idea implicit in this emergence ascription is that the molecule
XY belongs somehow to a “higher level” of the world’s layered ontology, for it
is a “whole” made of – and yet somehow “greater than” – its “parts” X and Y.
As this illustration makes clear, the doctrine of emergent evolution allows for
the advent of “genuine novelties” through time, in spite of a thorough ontologi-
cal determinism. As it has been claimed above, this is then a way of conciliating
gradualism and saltationism: the evolution from X and Y to XY is not purely
gradualist – insofar as something radically new appears in the synthesis pro-
cess –, yet it is not purely saltationist – for the result of the process, XY, is
compositionally determined, in accordance with the corresponding emergence
law, by its conditions of advent, X and Y, so it is not broken off from them.
Equivalently, emergent evolution is committed to ontological monism (X, Y and
XY are made of one and the same “stuff”), yet it is antireductionistic (XY is
irreducible to X and Y).
Before turning to the way in which emergent evolutionism deals with the
Laplacean argument presented in section 2, some remarks are worth making.
First, our toy illustration can easily be generalized to any field beside chem-
istry. The entities X, Y and XY can be replaced by whichever entities one likes
(quarks, atoms, cells, organs, individuals, populations, galaxies, etc.), to the
extent that emergence is a rather mundane and frequent relation – if it is not
merely ubiquitous.
Second, it is important to stress the fact that the unpredictability involved
in our toy example is to be taken in its theoretical sense, i.e. as the impossibility
to specify in advance what the nature and behavior of XY will turn out to be
on the sole basis of information that pertains to the chemistry of X and Y.
In particular, what is assumed here is that the chemist does not have fore-
knowledge of the emergence law connecting X and Y to XY. Of course, should
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she already know such a law – e.g. had she already noted and observed in the
past (or heard about some other scientist having noted and observed in the
past) the emergence of XY from X and Y –, she would indeed be in a position
to foretell inductively the nature and behavior of XY, thanks to the ontological
determinism underlying emergent evolution.
Finally, it is noteworthy that emergent evolutionism primarily construes
emergence in an ontological sense, even if emergence has, secondarily, epistemic
effects. It is indeed in virtue of the fact that emergents are brute empirical
facts that emergence laws are non-deducible from basal laws, and hence that
emergents are theoretically unpredictable before their advent11.
4.2. Emergent evolutionism and the denial of I3
Now that the doctrine of emergent evolutionism has been introduced, we can
turn to the prime objective of showing how it objects to the Laplacean argu-
ment. To begin with, it should be clear through what has been said so far that
emergent evolutionism actually does reject the Laplacean picture. As we have
seen, emergent evolutionism universally endorses Lo and So: all natural systems
– emergent and non-emergent – are considered as ontologically deterministic. In
particular, the very nature and behavior of the newly synthesized molecule XY
are indeed completely and univocally determined by the nature and behavior of
the molecules X and Y – together with the corresponding emergence law – to the
extent that each time a given compound is made of X and Y in the appropriate
way, one can be sure that it will turn out to be XY (and behave like XY).
Yet, in spite of this, emergent evolutionism doesn’t endorse the claim that
all deterministic systems (that is, in this case, all natural systems) should be
11Accordingly, in the broad spectrum of the various possible forms of emergentism, emer-
gent evolutionism is committed to what is sometimes called “ontological emergence” or “causal
emergence” (Sartenaer (2013) or Sartenaer (forthcomingb)). Furthermore, one can also say
that emergent evolutionism lies primarily within the “explanatory” – rather that the “predic-
tion” – tradition of emergence, for emergence first entails non-deducibility, which then entails
unpredictability (Sartenaer (2015)).
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predictable in principle. In particular, emergent systems, on the model of the
molecule XY, are unpredictable, even in the eyes of an absolutely competent
scientist like a Laplacean demon. Such an unpredictability is, as we have seen,
primarily theoretical. But it can actually turn out to be also inductive, in
the special case where the system at stake undergoes its emergence for the
first time in the history of the evolving universe, a case that Morgan refers to
as “primary novelty” (in contrast with the subsequent emergences which are
dubbed “secondary novelties”; see Morgan (1933)). In such a case – on which I
will focus in what follows –, a Laplacean demon would indeed lack the evidence
basis to inductively predict the nature and the behavior of the emergent.
Consequently, emergent evolutionism is committed to the existence of onto-
logically deterministic systems that are radically unpredictable. Before elucidat-
ing how emergent evolutionism actually manages to vindicate the consistence of
Lo ∧ So ∧ (¬P ) in the face of the Laplacean argument, it should first be noted
that it does so independently of the truth or falsity of entailments I1 and I2.
Accordingly, emergent evolutionism is committed to the existence of ontologi-
cally deterministic, yet radically unpredictable systems for reasons that are, as
it is expressed below, conceptually distinct from the ones invoked in section 3 in
relation with chaos theory and Bohmian quantum mechanics. Put differently,
all natural systems could behave “classically” – that is, not “chaotically” as well
as not “quantumly” –, and emergent evolutionism would still conflict with the
Laplacean picture12. Emergent evolutionism completely tolerates – and even
12This conceptual independence between emergent evolutionism and the two frameworks
that are chaos theory and Bohmian quantum mechanics is actually doubled by a contingent,
historical independence. There is nothing in the doctrine put forward by Morgan or Sellars
in the 1920s that even remotely appeals to something like algorithmic incompressibility or
the unavailability of non-disturbing measurements. For that matter, algorithmic incompress-
ibility has been put forward on the basis of the algorithmic complexity theory developed by
Kolmogorov, Chaitin and Solomonoff in the 1960s, so more than 30 years after the fall of emer-
gent evolutionism. So if emergent evolutionism endorsed a thesis like ¬P , it is obviously not
through some computational criterion (Humphreys (2008), p. 434). Furthermore, and even
without speaking about the Bohmian interpretation, the quantum revolution in the physical
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more, actually endorsed – the idea that the whole universe at a given moment
is perfectly transparent in the eyes of an absolutely competent cognitive being.
Now what emergent evolutionism does deny in order to refuse the Laplacean
picture is thesis (I3) Le ∧ Se → P . So what is actually denied by emergent
evolutionism is the idea that an absolutely competent cognitive being, for whom
the world is perfectly transparent – to the effect that she is able to capture under
a predictive algorithm all the laws that govern all natural (hence ontologically
deterministic) systems at a given time (Le) and know the precise state in which
all these systems are at a given time (Se) –, is nevertheless not able to predict
(theoretically or inductively) the state in which systems that emerge for the
first time will be at a later time (¬P )13.
The emergentist way of vindicating such a claim – which is actually already
encapsulated in what has been said so far about the doctrine – is ultimately
grounded in the conjunction of two facts (see figure 1). First and by definition,
there is always a temporal delay between the moment t1 or t2 when a Laplacean
demon performs her prediction about a given system S, and the moment t3
(such that t3 > t1 and t3 > t2) when this prediction about S matches reality (or
not). Second, S can always undergo a primary emergence at a given moment te
comprised between t3 and t1 and/or between t3 and t2. And when this happens
– for example between t1 and t3 –, the predictive algorithm of the demon having
performed her prediction at t1 becomes immediately obsolete for anticipating
the states of S after te. The reason for this is that such an algorithm, which
sciences occurred after the advent of emergent evolutionism. It would even be part of the
reason why the doctrine of emergent evolution collapsed at the turn of the 1930s (McLaughlin
(1992)).
13At first glance, such a claim may seem highly counter-intuitive. However, it actually sticks
to the letter of emergent evolutionism. As an illustration, see Broad’s assertion (Broad (1925),
p. 71): “If the emergent theory of chemical compounds be true, a mathematical archangel,
gifted with the further power of perceiving the microscopic structure of atoms as easily as we
can perceive hay-stacks, could no more predict the behaviour of silver or of chlorine or the
properties of silver-chloride without having observed samples of those substances than we can
at present”.
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contains all the laws {Li1}ni=1 that govern S at t1 and into which the perfectly
accurate specification S1 of the state of S at t1 has been plugged, cannot contain
the emergence law Ln+1 that will suddenly appear in the world at te, for this
law simply did not exist – even implicitly or potentially – before te, and could
not have been deduced from laws already in existence before te. Yet knowledge
of Ln+1 is required for predicting the states of S after te.
Of course, when no emergence happens between the moment t2 when the
demon performs her prediction and the moment t3 when her prediction is sup-
posed to come true, then the demon could inductively (though not theoretically)
predict the future states of the system, for the predictive algorithm that she has
at t2 would contain all the relevant laws existing at t2, including L
n+1.
Figure 1: The way in which the advent of emergents can impact the predictive tasks of
two Laplacean demons. Given a primary emergence occurring at te according to some
brute law Ln+1, a demon could not predict (theoretically or inductively) at t1 the right
state S∗3 in which a system would be at t3. By contrast, and because the emergence
law Ln+1 is part of her predictive algorithm, the demon could predict (inductively
though not theoretically) S∗3 at t2.
As a result, though Lo, So, Le and Se are taken to hold, emergent evolution-
ism denies the truth of P , where the predictability at stake can be construed
theoretically and inductively. It follows that I3 is false, and the Laplacean ar-
gument is successfully rejected.
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Before closing this section, some remarks are in order. First, even though I
insisted on the temporal facet of emergent evolution in the previous discussion,
it should not be forgotten that a hierarchical order also underlies the whole
picture. In the example depicted on figure 1, the system at t2 and t3 indeed
belongs to a “higher level” of the world’s layered ontology than the system at
t1, and the emergence law L
n+1 governs the transition between these levels.
Second, emergent evolution is highly asymmetric (temporally and hierarchi-
cally), to the effect that, while prediction can be impossible in principle, retro-
diction is always possible. The “retrodictive” algorithm that a demon would
have at a time t would indeed always contain all the necessary laws to retrodict
the state of the system at any previous time t′, even in the case where primary
emergences have occurred between t′ and t.
Finally, as we have seen, emergent laws are parts of a thoroughly determinate
“natural plan”, whose content cannot be accessed in advance, or prior to its
concretization in nature, by any cognitive being, even omniscient14. These
laws are supposed to be brute and ultimate, to the effect that they cannot be
explained. They simply have to be admitted with a so-called “natural piety”
(Alexander (1920), p. 47). Such ideas are actually far from being metaphysically
innocent. It is then no wonder that they have been the main focus of a great deal
of early criticisms against emergentism (see for instance Russell et al. (1926),
McDougall (1929), chapter 5, Montague (1929) or Ablowitz (1939)), and have
contributed to the premature fall of this doctrine.
This being said, it is worth emphasizing the fact that emergent evolutionism
has been recently revived in a far less controversial or heavily-loaded metaphys-
ical way, especially by condensed matter physicists like the Nobel prize winners
14Of course, this suggests that there is paradoxically some limit to the possible omniscience
of such beings. While they can know everything that exists at some moment in the natural
world (including the states of all systems and all natural laws), they cannot know in ad-
vance the details of the plan of emergent evolution (which is supposed to be ultimately the
manifestation of God’s inscrutable activity; see for instance Morgan (1923), p. 9).
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P. W. Anderson or, in his wake, R. B. Laughlin. According to the latter (Laugh-
lin (2005), 208-209), nature indeed generates “higher organizational laws” that
“follow from collective behavior” and that “are not just a quaint side show but
everything – the true source of physical law, including perhaps the most funda-
mental laws we know”. These laws “destroy predictive power”, insofar as they
cannot be deduced from the underlying equations (see in particular Laughlin
& Pines (2000), p. 30). The close connection of this set of ideas with the core
tenets of emergent evolutionism that have been expressed in section 4.1 is even
doubled by a common methodological prescription for science: science should
not seek to capture the ultimate laws of a rock-bottom level of reality in order
to construct a deductive path from it to higher-level laws; It should rather fo-
cus on experimentation and catalogue the different laws of emergence. Such a
contrast can be illustrated with the help of figure 1. In the light of emergent
evolutionism or its recent revival, scientists should stop working as the reduc-
tionistically inclined demon who tries at t1 – without any chance of success –
to predict the behavior that S will exhibit at t3. They should rather humbly
content themselves with adopting the attitude of the emergence-friendly demon
who waits until t2 to make such a prediction (in an inductive sense), once she
has been able to experimentally catalogue the relevant law of emergence Ln+1.
Of course the connection between the historical doctrine of emergent evolu-
tionism and its recent revival in condensed matter physics should not be taken
too far, as a more detailed analysis would certainly reveal some non-trivial di-
vergences. Nonetheless, the connection is tight enough to be the ground of the
claim that the coexistence of ontological determinism with in-principle unpre-
dictability can still today be reasonably vindicated on the basis of a denial of
(I3), hence without the necessary recourse to some specific features of chaos
theory or Bohmian quantum mechanics.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, I first framed an argument – referred to as the “Laplacean
argument” – on the following model:
(P1) Lo
(P2) So
(I1) Lo → Le
(I2) So → Se
(I3) Le ∧ Se → P
(C) P
where Lo, So, Le, Se and P respectively denote the theses of ontological deter-
mination, state determinateness, epistemic determination, state determinabil-
ity and in-principle predictability. This argument, which has been tacitly and
massively endorsed from the advent of modern science onwards, captures the
belief that ontological determinism (Lo ∧ So) entails epistemic determinism
(Le ∧ Se ∧ P ), and hence in-principle predictability (P ). Put differently, given
the fact that the states of a system are well-defined (So) and univocally de-
termine the system’s other states (Lo), a perfectly competent cognitive being
– e.g. a Laplacean demon – should be able to determine the state of the system
at a given moment (Se) and plug this specification into a predictive algorithm
(Le), to the effect that she should be in a position to predict any future state of
the system (P ). Framing the Laplacean argument in such a way has one non-
negligible advantage: it allows us to identify three conceptually independent
options for rejecting it, viz. denying either I1, I2 or I3.
In section 3.1, I mentioned that chaos theory is an adequate framework
to exemplify the first option – denying I1 –, for the best algorithm one can
come up with in chaotic situations is incompressible, and hence inadequate for
the purpose of prediction. In section 3.2, I briefly expressed the reasons why
Bohmian mechanics is suited for the job of rejecting I2. The principles of this
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theory indeed prevent any cognitive being from simultaneously knowing the
positions and wave functions of particles at any given moment, even given the
assumption that these are perfectly determinate at any given moment. Both
these approaches have received much attention over the last decades, to the
extent that the divorce between (ontological) determinism and predictability is
no more considered as heretical today.
Finally, in section 4, I exemplified the remaining approach – denying I3 – in
an older (though recently revived) framework that is often overlooked when it
comes to the issue of determinism, namely the doctrine of emergent evolutionism
as championed in the beginning of the 20th century by philosophers like Morgan
or Sellars. On the basis of the metaphysical (though radically not innocent)
claim that, during evolution, entities and laws emerge now and then as brute
empirical and ultimate facts, such a view also succeeds in objecting to the
Laplacean argument.
As a result, it should now be clear that a peaceful coexistence of ontolog-
ical determinism with in-principle unpredictability doesn’t necessarily require
chaotic or quantum considerations (even if these can constitute sufficient con-
ditions for such a coexistence). A “third way” is available, in the wake of a
certain construal of emergence that has recently proved to be of a prime scien-
tific interest.
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